Abstract. Many privacy-type properties of security protocols can be modelled using trace equivalence properties in suitable process algebras. It has been shown that such properties can be decided for interesting classes of finite processes (i.e., without replication) by means of symbolic execution and constraint solving. However, this does not suffice to obtain practical tools. Current prototypes suffer from a classical combinatorial explosion problem caused by the exploration of many interleavings in the behaviour of processes. Mödersheim et al. [17] have tackled this problem for reachability properties using partial order reduction techniques. We revisit their work, generalize it and adapt it for equivalence checking. We obtain an optimization in the form of a reduced symbolic semantics that eliminates redundant interleavings on the fly.
Introduction
Security protocols are widely used today to secure transactions that rely on public channels like the Internet, where dishonest users may listen to communications and interfere with them. A secure communication has a different meaning depending on the underlying application. It ranges from the confidentiality of data (medical files, secret keys, etc.) to, e.g., verifiability in electronic voting systems. Another example is the notion of privacy that appears in many contexts such as vote-privacy in electronic voting or untraceability in RFID technologies.
Formal methods have proved their usefulness for precisely analyzing the security of protocols. In particular, a wide variety of model-checking approaches have been developed to analyse protocols against an attacker who entirely controls the communication network, and several tools are now available to automatically verify cryptographic protocols [7, 14, 5] . A major challenge faced here is that one has to account for infinitely many behaviours of the attacker, who can generate arbitrary messages. In order to cope with this prolific attacker problem and obtain decision procedures, approaches based on symbolic semantics and constraint resolution have been proposed [16, 19] . This has lead to tools for verifying reachability-based security properties such as confidentiality [16] or, more recently, equivalence-based properties such as privacy [21, 11, 9] .
In both cases, the practical impact of most of these tools is limited by a typical state explosion problem caused by the exploration of the large number of interleavings in the protocol's behaviour. In standard model-checking approaches for concurrent systems, the interleaving problem is handled using partial order reduction techniques [18] . For instance, the order of execution of two independent (parallel) actions is typically irrelevant for checking reachability. Things become more complex when working with a symbolic semantics: the states obtained from the interleaving of parallel actions will differ, but the sets of concrete states that they represent will have a significant overlap. Earlier work has shown how to limit this overlap [17] in the context of reachability properties for security protocols, leading to high efficiency gains in the OFMC tool of the AVISPA platform [5] .
In this paper, we revisit the work of [17] to obtain a partial order reduction technique for the verification of equivalence properties. Specifically, we focus on trace equivalence, requiring that two processes have the same sets of observable traces and perform indistinguishable sequences of outputs. This notion is wellstudied and several algorithms and tools support it [8, 13, 21, 11, 9] . Contrary to what happens for reachability-based properties, trace equivalence cannot be decided relying only on the reachable states. The sequence of actions that leads to this state plays a role. Hence, extra precautions have to be taken before discarding a particular interleaving: we have to ensure that this is done in both sides of the equivalence in a similar fashion. Our main contribution is an optimized form of equivalence that discards a lot of interleavings, and a proof that this reduced equivalence coincides with trace equivalence. Furthermore, our study brings an improvement of the original technique [17] that would apply equally well for reachability checking.
Outline. In Section 2, we introduce our model for security processes. We consider the class of simple processes introduced in [12] , with else branches and no replication. Then we present two successive optimizations in the form of refined semantics and associated trace equivalences. Section 3 presents a compressed semantics that limits interleavings by executing blocks of actions. Then, this is lifted to a symbolic semantics in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 presents the reduced semantics which makes use of dependency constraints to remove more interleavings. We conclude in Section 6, mentioning a preliminary implementation that shows efficiency gains in practice and some directions for future work.
Model for security protocols
In this section, we introduce the cryptographic process calculus that we will use to describe security protocols. This calculus is close to the applied pi calculus [1] .
Messages
A protocol consists of some agents communicating on a network. Messages sent by agents are modeled using a term algebra. We assume two infinite and disjoint sets of variables, X and W. Members of X are denoted x, y, z, whereas members of W are denoted w and used as handles for previously output terms. We also assume a set N of names, which are used for representing keys or nonces, and a signature Σ consisting of a finite set of function symbols. Terms are generated inductively from names, variables, and function symbols applied to other terms. For S ⊆ X ∪ W ∪ N , the set of terms built from S by applying function symbols in Σ is denoted by T (S). Terms in T (N ∪X ) represent messages and are denoted by u, v, etc. while terms in T (W) represent recipes (describing how the attacker built a term from the available outputs) and are written M , N , R. We write fv (t) for the set of variables (from X or W) occurring in a term t. A term is ground if it does not contain any variable, i.e., it belongs to T (N ). We may rely on a sort system for terms, but its details are unimportant for this paper.
To model algebraic properties of cryptographic primitives, we consider an equational theory E. The theory will usually be generated for finite axioms and enjoy nice properties, but these aspects are irrelevant for the present work.
Example 1. In order to model asymmetric encryption and pairing, we consider: Σ = {aenc(·, ·), adec(·, ·), pk(·), ·, · , π 1 (·), π 2 (·)}. To take into account the properties of these operators, we consider the equational theory E aenc generated by the three following equations:
adec(aenc(x, pk(y)), y) = x, π 1 ( x 1 , x 2 ) = x 1 , and π 2 ( x 1 , x 2 ) = x 2 . For instance, we have π 2 (adec(aenc( n, pk(ska) , pk(skb)), skb)) = Eaenc pk(ska).
Processes
We do not need the full applied pi calculus to represent security protocols. Here, we only consider public channels and we assume that each process communicates on a dedicated channel.
Formally, we assume a set C of channels and we consider the fragment of simple processes without replication built on basic processes as defined in [12] . A basic process represents a party in a protocol, which may sequentially perform actions such as waiting for a message, checking that a message has a certain form, or outputting a message. Then, a simple process is a parallel composition of such basic processes playing on distinct channels. Definition 1 (basic/simple process). The set of basic processes on c ∈ C is defined using the following grammar (below u, v ∈ T (N ∪ X ) and x ∈ X ):
output A simple process P = {P 1 , . . . , P n } is a multiset of basic processes P i on pairwise distinct channels c i . We assume that null processes are removed.
For conciseness, we often omit brackets, null processes, and even "else 0". Basic processes are denoted by the letters P and Q, whereas simple processes are denoted using P and Q.
During an execution, the attacker learns the messages that have been sent on the different public channels. Those messages are organized into a frame.
Definition 2 (frame).
A frame Φ is a substitution whose domain is included in W and image is included in T (N ∪ X ). It is written {w ⊲ u, . . .}. A frame is closed when its image only contains ground terms.
An extended simple proces (denoted A or B) is a pair made of a simple process and a frame. Similarly, we define extended basic processes. Note that we do not have an explicit set of restricted names. Actually, all names are restricted and public ones are explicitly given to the attacker through a frame.
Example 2. We consider the protocol given in [2] designed for transmitting a secret without revealing its identity to other participants. In this protocol, A is willing to engage in communication with B and wants to reveal its identity to B. However, A does not want to compromise its privacy by revealing its identity or the identity of B more broadly. The participants A and B proceed as follows:
Moreover, if the message received by B is not of the expected form then B sends out a "decoy" message: {N b } pub B . This message should basically look like B's other message from the point of view of an outsider.
Relying on the signature and equational theory introduced in Example 1, a session of role A played by agent a (with private key ska) with b (whose public key is pkb) can be modeled as follows:
in(c A , x). if π 1 (adec(x, ska)), π 2 (π 2 (adec(x, ska))) = n a , pkb then 0 Here, we are only considering the authentication protocol. A more comprehensive model should include the access to an application in case of a success. Similarly, a session of role B played by agent b with a can be modeled by the following basic proces where N = adec(y, skb).
To model a scenario with one session of each role (played by the agents a and b), we may consider the extended process (P; Φ 0 ) where: -P = {P (ska, pk(skb)), Q(skb, pk(ska))}, and
The purpose of pk(ska ′ ) will be clear later on. It allows us to consider the existence of another agent a ′ whose public key pk(ska ′ ) is known by the attacker.
Semantics
We first define a standard concrete semantics. Thus, in this section, we work only with closed extended processes, i.e., processes (P; Φ) where fv (P) = ∅.
if w is a fresh variable where c ∈ C, w ∈ W and x ∈ X .
A process may input any term that an attacker can build (rule In): {x → u} is a substitution that replaces any occurrence of x with u. In the Out rule, we enrich the attacker's knowledge by adding the newly output term u, with a fresh handle w, to the frame. The two remaining rules are unobservable (τ action) from the point of view of the attacker. This trace corresponds to the normal execution of one instance of the protocol. The two silent actions have been triggered using the Then rule. The resulting frame Φ is as follows: Φ 0 ⊎ {w 3 ⊲ aenc( n a , pk(ska) , pk(skb)), w 4 ⊲ aenc( n a , n b , pk(skb) , pk(ska))}.
Trace equivalence
Many interesting security properties, such as privacy-type properties studied e.g., in [4] , are formalized using the notion of trace equivalence. We first introduce the notion of static equivalence that compares sequences of messages.
Definition 3 (static equivalence). Two frames Φ and Φ
′ are in static equivalence, Φ ∼ Φ ′ , when we have that dom(Φ) = dom(Φ ′ ), and:
Intuitively, two frames are equivalent if an attacker cannot see the difference between the two situations they represent, i.e., they satisfy the same equalities.
Example 4.
Consider the frame Φ given in Example 3 and the frame Φ ′ below:
Actually, we have that Φ ∼ Φ ′ . Intuitively, the equivalence holds since the attacker is not able to decrypt any of the ciphertexts, and each ciphertext contains a nonce that prevents him to build it from its components. Now, if we decide to give access to n a to the attacker, i.e., considering Φ + = Φ ⊎ {w 5 ⊲ n a } and Φ ′ + = Φ ′ ⊎ {w 5 ⊲ n a }, then the two frames Φ + and Φ ′ + are not in static equivalence anymore. Let M = aenc( w 5 , w 1 , w 2 ) and N = w 3 . We have that 
The processes A and B are trace equivalent, denoted by A ≈ B, if A ⊑ B and B ⊑ A.
Example 5. Intuitively, the private authentication protocol presented in Example 2 preserves anonymity if an attacker cannot distinguish whether b is willing to talk to a (represented by the process Q(skb, pk(ska))) or willing to talk to a ′ (represented by the process Q(skb, pk(ska ′ ))), provided a, a ′ and b are honest participants. This can be expressed relying on the following equivalence:
For illustration purposes, we also consider a variant of the process Q, denoted Q 0 , where its else branch has been replaced by else 0. We will see that the "decoy" message plays a crucial role to ensure privacy. We have that:
(Q 0 (skb, pk(ska)); Φ 0 ) in(cB ,aenc( w1,w1 ,w2))·τ ·out(cB ,w3)
This trace has no counterpart in (Q 0 (skb, pk(ska ′ )); Φ 0 ). Indeed, we have that:
in(cB ,aenc( w1,w1 ,w2))·τ
Hence, we have that (Q 0 (skb, pk(ska)); Φ 0 ) ≈ (Q 0 (skb, pk(ska ′ )); Φ 0 ). Actually, it can been shown that (Q(skb, pk(ska)); Φ 0 ) ≈ (Q(skb, pk(ska ′ )); Φ 0 ). This is a non trivial equivalence that can be checked using the tool APTE [10] within few seconds for a simple scenario as the one considered here, and that takes few minutes/days as soon as we want to consider 2/3 sessions of each role.
Reduction based on grouping actions
A large number of possible interleavings results into multiple occurrences of identical states. The compression step lifts a common optimization that partly tackles this issue in the case of reachability properties to trace equivalence. The key idea is to force processes to perform all enabled output actions as soon as possible. In our setting, we can even safely force them to perform a complete block of input actions followed by ouput actions.
Example 6. Consider the process (P; Φ) with P = {in(c 1 , x).P 1 , out(c 2 , b).P 2 }. In order to reach ({P 1 {x → u}, P 2 }; Φ ∪ {w ⊲ b}), we have to execute the action in(c 1 , x) (using a recipe M that allows one to deduce u) and the action out(c 2 , b) (giving us a label of the form out(c 2 , w)). In case of reachability properties, the execution order of these actions only matters if M uses w. Thus we can safely perform the outputs in priority.
The situation is more complex when considering trace equivalence. In that case, we are concerned not only with reachable states, but also with how those states are reached. Quite simply, traces matter. Thus, if we want to discard the trace in(c 1 , M ).out(c 2 , w) when studying process P and consider only its permutation out(c 2 , w).in(c 1 , M ), we have to make sure that the same permutation is available on the other process. The key to ensure that identical permutations will be available on both sides of the equivalence is our restriction to the class of simple processes.
Compressed semantics
We now introduce the compressed semantics. Compression is an optimization, since it removes some interleavings. But it also gives rise to convenient "macroactions", called blocks, that combine a sequence of inputs followed by some outputs, potentially hiding silent actions. Manipulating those blocks rather than indiviual actions makes it easier to define our second optimization.
For sake of simplicity, we consider initial simple processes. A simple process A = (P; Φ) is initial if for any P ∈ P, we have that P = in(c, x).P ′ for some channel c, i.e., each basic process composing A starts with an input action.
Example 7.
Continuing Example 2, ({P (ska, pk(skb)), Q(skb, pk(ska))}; Φ 0 ) is not initial. Instead, we may consider ({P init , Q(skb, pk(ska))}; Φ 0 ) where:
assuming that start is a (public) constant in our signature.
The main idea of the compressed semantics is to ensure that when a basic process starts executing some actions, it actually executes a maximal block of actions. In analogy with focusing in sequent calculus, we say that the basic process takes the focus, and can only release it under particular conditions. We define in Figure 1 how blocks can be executed by extended basic processes. In that semantics, the label ℓ denotes the stage of the execution, starting with i + , then i * after the first input and o * after the first output. where Φ is as given in Example 5. As illustrated by the prooftree below, we have also (Q 0 (skb, pk(ska)); Φ 0 )
with ℓ ∈ {i
out(c,w).tr 
where Q ′ def = if pk(ska) = pk(ska) then out(c B , u) for some message u.
Then we define the compressed reduction − → c between extended simple processes as the least reflexive transitive relation satisfying the following rules:
A basic process is allowed to properly end a block execution when it has performed outputs and it cannot perform any more. Accordingly, we call proper block a non-empty sequence of inputs followed by a non-empty sequence of outputs, all on the same channel. For completeness, we also allow improper termination of a block, when the basic process that is currently executing is not able to perform any visible action (input or output) and it has not yet performed an output.
Example 9. Continuing Example 8, using the rule block, we can derive that:
We can also derive ({P init , Q 0 (skb, pk(ska
in(cB ,aenc( w1,w1 ,w2))
Φ 0 ) (using the rule Improper). Note that the resulting simple process is reduced to ∅ even though P init has never been executed.
At first sight, killing the whole process when applying the rule Improper may seem too strong. Actually, even if this kind of scenario is observable by the attacker, it does not bring him any new knowledge, hence it plays only a limited role: it is in fact sufficient to consider such improper blocks at the end of traces.
Its compressed traces are of the form in(c, M ).in(c, N ) and in(c ′ , M ′ ). The concatenation of those two improper traces cannot be executed in the compressed semantics. Intuitively, we do not loose anything for trace equivalence, because if a process can exhibit those two improper blocks they must be in parallel and hence considering their combination is redundant.
We define the notion of compressed trace equivalence (resp. inclusion) accordingly relying on − → c instead of = ⇒, and we denote them ≈ c (resp. ⊑ c ).
Soundness and completeness
The purpose of this section is to establish the soundness and completeness of the compressed semantics. More precisely, we show that the two relations ≈ and ≈ c coincide on initial simple processes.
Intuitively, we can always permute output (resp. input) actions occurring on distinct channels, and we can also permute an output with an input if the outputted message is not used to build the inputted term. More formally, we define an independence relation I a over actions as the least symmetric relation satisfying:
Then, we consider = Ia to be the least congruence (w.r.t. concatenation) satisfying act · act ′ = Ia act ′ · act for all act and act ′ with act I a act ′ , and we show that processes are equally able to execute equivalent (w.r.t. = Ia ) traces. Theorem 1. Let A and B be two initial simple processes. We have that:
Proof. (Sketch)
The main difficulty is that Proposition 2 only considers traces composed of proper blocks whereas we have to consider all traces. To prove the ⇒ implication, we have to pay attention to the last block of the compressed trace that can be an improper one (composed of several inputs on a channel c). The ⇐ implication is more difficult since we have to consider a trace tr of a process A that is an interleaving of some prefix of proper and improper blocks. We will first complete it to obtain an interleaving of complete blocks and improper blocks. We then reorganize the actions providing an equivalent trace tr ′ w.r.t. = Ia such that tr ′ = tr io · tr in where tr io is made of proper blocks and tr in is made of improper blocks. For each improper block b of tr in , we show by applying Lemma 1 and Proposition 2 that A is able to perform tr io · b in the compressed semantics and thus B as well. Finally, we show that the executions of all those (concurrent) blocks b can be put together, obtaining that B can perform tr ′ .
⊓ ⊔
Note that, as illustrated by the following example, the two underlying notions of trace inclusion do not coincide.
Example 11. Let P = in(c, x) and Q = in(c, x).out(c, n). Actually, we have that (P ; ∅) ⊑ (Q; ∅) whereas (P ; ∅) ⊑ c (Q; ∅) since in the compressed semantics Q is not allowed to stop its execution after its first input.
Deciding trace equivalence via constraint solving
In this section, we propose a symbolic semantics for our compressed semantics following, e.g., [16, 6] . Such a semantics avoids potentially infinite branching of our reduction semantics due to inputs from the environment. Correctness is maintained by associating with each process a set of constraints on terms.
Constraint systems
Following the notations of [6] , we consider a new set X 2 of second-order variables, denoted by X, Y , etc. We shall use those variables to abstract over recipes. We denote by fv 2 (o) the set of free second-order variables of an object o, typically a constraint system. To prevent ambiguities, we shall use fv 1 instead of fv for free first-order variables.
Definition 5 (constraint system).
A constraint system C = (Φ; S) consists of a frame Φ, and a set of constraints S. We consider three kinds of constraints:
The first kind of constraint expresses that a recipe X has to use only variables from a certain set D, and that the obtained term should be x. The handles in D represent terms that have been previously outputted by the process.
We are not interested in general constraint systems, but only consider constraint systems that are well-formed. Given C, we define a dependency order on fv 1 (C) ∩ X by declaring that x depends on y if, and only if, S contains a deduction constraint D ⊢ ? X x with y ∈ fv 1 (Φ(D)). For C to be a well-formed constraint system, we require that the dependency relationship is acyclic and that for every
, pk(ska))} with N = adec(y, skb), and S be a set containing two constraints:
Y y and π 2 (N ) = ? pk(ska).
We have that C = (Φ; S) is a well-formed constraint system. There is only one first-order variable y ∈ fv 1 (C)∩X , and it does not occur in fv 1 (Φ({w 0 , w 1 , w 2 })), which is empty. Moreover, there is indeed a unique constraint that introduces y.
Our notion of well-formed constraint systems is in line with what is used e.g., in [16, 6] . We use a simpler and (slightly) more permissive variant because we are not concerned with constraint solving procedures in this work.
Definition 6 (solution).
A solution of a constraint system C = (Φ; S) is a substitution θ such that dom(θ) = fv 2 (C), and Xθ ∈ T (D C (X)) for any X ∈ dom(θ). Moreover, we require that there exists a ground substitution λ with dom(λ) = fv 1 (C) such that:
The set of solutions of a constraint system C is denoted Sol(C). Since we consider constraint systems that are well-formed, the substitution λ is unique modulo E given θ ∈ Sol(C). We denote it by λ θ when C is clear from the context. Example 13. Consider again the constraint system C given in Example 12. We have that θ = {Y → aenc( w 1 , w 1 , w 2 )} is a solution of C. Its associated firstorder solution is λ θ = {y → aenc( pk(ska), pk(ska) , pk(skb))}.
Symbolic processes: syntax and semantics
From a simple process (P; Φ), we compute the constraint systems capturing its possible executions, starting from the symbolic process (P; Φ; ∅). Note that we are now manipulating processes that rely on free variables.
Definition 7 (symbolic process). A symbolic process is a tuple (P; Φ; S)
where (Φ; S) is a constraint system and fv
We give below a standard symbolic semantics for our symbolic processes.
X x}) where X (resp. x) is a fresh second-order (resp. first-order) variable
Out
(out(c, u).P ; Φ; S)
out(c,w)
where w is a fresh first-order variable
From this semantics, we derive our compressed symbolic semantics tr − − → c following the same pattern as for the concrete semantics (see Section B.1 in Appendix). We consider interleavings that execute maximal blocks of actions, and we allow improper termination of a block only at the end of a trace. w 3 ) , and -C = (Φ; S) is the constraint system defined in Example 12.
We are now able to define our notion of (symbolic) trace equivalence.
Definition 8 (trace equivalence w.r.t. tr − → c ). Let A = (P; Φ) and B = (Q; Ψ ) be two simple processes. We have that A ⊑ s B when, for every sequence tr such that (P; Φ; ∅)
, we have that:
We have that A and B are in trace equivalence w.r.t.
, and θ ∈ Sol(Φ; S) (see Example 12) . The only symbolic process that is reachable from (Q 0 (b, a ′ ); Φ 0 ; ∅) using tr is (∅; Φ ′ ; S ′ ) with:
We can check that θ is not a solution of (Φ ′ ; S ′ ).
For processes without replication, the symbolic transition system is finite. Thus, deciding (symbolic) trace equivalence between processes boils down to the problem of deciding a notion of equivalence between sets of constraint systems. This problem is well-studied and several procedures already exist [6, 13, 11] .
Soundness and completeness
Using the usual approach, such as the one developed in [6, 12] , we can show soundness and completeness of our symbolic compressed semantics w.r.t. our concrete compressed semantics. We have:
-Soundness: each transition in the compressed symbolic semantics represents a set of transitions that can be done in the concrete compressed semantics. -Completeness: each transition in the compressed semantics can be matched by a transition in the compressed symbolic semantics.
Finally, relying on these two results, we can establish that symbolic trace equivalence (≈ s ) exactly captures compressed trace equivalence (≈ c ).
Theorem 2. For any extended simple processes A and B, we have that:
A ⊑ c B ⇐⇒ A ⊑ s B.
Reduction using dependency constraints
Unlike compression, which is based only on the input/output nature of actions, our second optimization takes into account the exchanged messages. Let us first illustrate one simple instance of our optimization and how dependency constraints [17] may be used to incorporate it in symbolic semantics. Let P i = in(c i , x i ).out(c i , u i ).P ′ i with i ∈ {1, 2}, and Φ 0 = {w 0 ⊲ n} be a closed frame. We consider the simple process A = ({P 1 , P 2 }; Φ 0 ), and the two symbolic interleavings depicted below.
•
The two resulting symbolic processes are of the form ({P
The sets of concrete processes that these two symbolic processes represent are different, which means that we cannot discard any of those interleavings. However, these sets have a significant overlap corresponding to concrete instances of the interleaved blocks that are actually independent, i.e., where the output of one block is not necessary to obtain the input of the next block. In order to avoid considering such concrete processes twice, we may add a dependency constraint X 1 ⋉w 2 in C 2 , whose purpose is to discard all solutions θ such that the message x 1 λ θ can be derived without using w 2 ⊲ u 2 λ θ . For instance, the concrete trace in(c 2 , w 0 ) · out(c 2 , w 2 ) · in(c 1 , w 0 ) · out(c 1 , w 1 ) would be discarded thanks to this new constraint.
The idea of [17] is to accumulate dependency constraints generated whenever such a pattern is detected in an execution, and use an adapted constraint resolution procedure to narrow and eventually discard the constrained symbolic states. We seek to exploit similar ideas for optimizing the verification of trace equivalence rather than reachability. This requires extra care, since pruning traces as described above may break completeness when considering trace equivalence. As before, the key to obtain a valid optimization will be to discard traces in a similar way on the two processes being compared. In addition to handling this necessary subtlety, we also propose a new proof technique for justifying dependency constraints. The generality of that technique allows us to add more dependency constraints, taking into account more patterns than the simple diamond shape from the previous example.
There are at least two natural semantics for dependency constraints. The simplest semantics focuses on the second-order notion of recipe. In the above example, it would require that recipe X 1 θ contains the variable w 2 . That is weaker than a first-order semantics requiring that any recipe derivinig x 1 λ θ would involve w 2 since spurious dependencies may easily be introduced. Our ultimate goal in this section is to show that trace equivalence w.r.t. the firstorder reduced semantics coincides with the regular symbolic semantics. However, we first establish this result for the second-order semantics, which is more easily analysed and provides a useful stepping stone.
Second-order reduced semantics
We start by introducing dependency constraints, in a more general form than the one used above, and give them a second-order semantics.
Definition 9 (dependency constraint).
A dependency constraint is a constraint of the form − → X ⋉ − → w where − → X is a vector of variables in X 2 , and − → w is a vector of handles, i.e. variables in W.
Given a substitution θ with dom(θ) ⊆ X 2 , and Xθ ∈ T (W) for any X ∈ dom(θ). We say that θ satisfies
A constraint system with dependency constraints is called a dependency constraint system. We denote by C
• the regular constraint system obtained by removing all dependency constraints from C. We only consider well-formed dependency constraint systems, that is those C such that C
• is well-formed. A solution of C is a substitution θ such that θ ∈ Sol(C • ) and θ |= − → X ⋉ − → w for each dependency constraint − → X ⋉ − → w ∈ C. We denote this set Sol 2 (C). We shall now define how dependency constraints will be added to our constraint systems. For this, we fix an arbitrary total order ≺ on channels. Intuitively, this order expresses which executions should be favored, and which should be allowed only under dependency constraints. To simplify the presentation, we use the notation io c ( − → X , − → w ) as a shortcut for in(c,
. . , X ℓ ) and − → w = (w 1 , . . . , w k ). Note that − → X and/or − → w may be empty.
Definition 10 (generation of dependency constraints). Let c be a channel, and tr
Otherwise, we have that dep (tr, c) = ∅.
We obtain our reduced semantics by integrating those dependency constraints into the symbolic compressed semantics. We define − → d as the least reflexive relation satisying the following rule:
Given a proper trace, we define Deps (tr) to be the accumulation of the generated constraints as defined above for all prefixes of tr (where each proper block is considered as an atomic action). We may observe that:
Example 16. Let a, b, and c be channels in C such that a ≺ b ≺ c. The dependency constraints generated during the symbolic execution of a simple process of the form ({in(a, x a ) .out(a,
We use io i as a shortcut for in(i, X i )·out(i, w i ) and we represent dependency constraints using arrows. For instance, on the trace io a · io c · io b , a dependency constraint of the form X b ⋉w c (represented by the left-most arrow) is generated. Now, on the trace io c · io a · io b we add X a ⋉w c after the second transition, and X b ⋉{w c , w a } (represented by the dashed 2-arrow) after the third transition. Intuitively, the latter constraint expresses that io b is only allowed to come after io c if it depends on it, possibly indirectly through io a . 
Soundness and completeness
In order to establish that ≈ s and ≈ 2 d coincide, we are going to study more carefully concrete traces made of (not necessarily proper) blocks. We denote by B the set of blocks io c ( − → M , − → w ) such that c ∈ C, M i ∈ T (W) for each M i ∈ − → M , and w j ∈ W for each w j ∈ − → w . In this section, a concrete trace is necessarily made of blocks, i.e., it belongs to B * . Note that all traces from executions in the compressed semantics are concrete traces in this sense. We show that we can view B * as a partially commutative monoid in a meaningful way. This allows us to lift a classic result in which we ground our reduced semantics.
We lift the ordering on channels to blocks:
′ . Finally, we define ≺ on concrete traces as the lexicographic extension of the order on blocks. We define similarly ≺ on symbolic traces.
Partially commutative monoid. We define an independence relation I b over B: 
The set of concrete traces, quotiented by this equivalence relation, is the partially commutative monoid obtained from I b . Given a concrete trace tr, we denote by min(tr) the minimum for ≺ among all the traces that are equal to tr modulo = I b .
First, we prove that the symbolic semantics is equally able to execute equivalent (w.r.t. = I b ) traces. Second we prove that the reduced semantics generates dependency constraints that are (only) satisfied by minimal traces. 
Proof (Sketch).
Let A tr − → c (P; Φ; S) and θ ∈ Sol(Φ; S). We need a characterization of minimal traces. We exploit the following one, which is equivalent to the characterization of Anisimov and Knuth [3] :
The trace t is minimal if, and only if, for all factors aub of t such that (1) a, b ∈ B, u ∈ B * and d ≺ b ≺ a for all d ∈ u, we have (2) some c ∈ au such that c I b b does not hold.
We remark that condition (1) characterizes the factors of (symbolic) traces for which we generate a dependency constraint. Here, that constraint would be
where α ∈ B is also written io cα ( − → X α , − → w α ) to have an access to its components. Then we note that (2) corresponds to the satisfaction of that dependency constraint in a concrete instance of the trace.
⊓ ⊔ Finally, relying on these results, we can establish that trace equivalence (≈ d ) w.r.t. the reduced semantics exactly captures symbolic trace equivalence (≈ s ).
Theorem 3. For any extended simple processes A and B, we have that:
Proof (Sketch). Implication (⇒) is straightforward and only relies on the fact that dependency constraints generated by the reduced semantics only depend on the trace that is executed. The other direction (⇐) is more interesting. Here, we only outline the main idea, in the case of a trace made of proper blocks. We show that a concrete trace trθ which is not captured when considering − → d (i.e., a trace trθ that does not satisfy the generated dependency constraints) can be mapped to another trace, namely min(trθ), which manipulates the same recipes/messages but where blocks are executed in a different order. Lemma 2 is used to obtain an execution of the minimal trace, and Lemma 3 ensures that dependency constraints are satisfied in that execution. Thus the minimal trace can also be executed by the other process. We go back to trθ using Lemma 2. ⊓ ⊔
First-order reduced semantics
We finally introduce the stronger, first-order semantics for dependency constraints, and we prove soundness and completeness for the corresponding equivalence property by building on the previous theorem.
Definition 11. Let C = (Φ; S) be a dependency constraint system. We define Sol 1 (C) to be the set of substitutions θ ∈ Sol(C • ) such that, for each − → X ⋉ − → w in C with non-empty − → w there is some
We define the notion of trace equivalence accordingly, as it has been done at the end of Section 5.1, relying on Sol 1 instead of Sol 2 . We denote it ≈ 
Theorem 4. For any extended simple processes A and B, we have that:
A ⊑
Proof (Sketch). (⇒)
This implication is relatively easy to establish. It actually relies on the fact that Sol 1 (C) ⊆ Sol 2 (C) for any dependency constraint system C. This allows us to use our hypothesis A ⊑ 2 d B. Then, in order to come back to our more constrainted first-order reduced semantics, we may notice that as soon as θ is a solution of C and C ′ (w.r.t. Sol 2 ) with static equivalence of their associated frames, we have that: θ ∈ Sol 1 (C) if, and only if, θ ∈ Sol 1 (C ′ ). (⇐) In order to exploit our hypothesis A ⊑ . Actually, we do this without changing the underlying first-order substitution, i.e., λ θ = λ θ ′ . This is done by a sub-induction; iteratively modifying θ and tr. Whenever θ is not already a first-order solution, we slightly modify it. We obtain a new substitution θ ′ that is not a second-order solution anymore w.r.t. tr, and we use Lemmas 2 and 3 to obtain a new trace tr ′ ≺ tr for which θ ′ is a second-order solution. By induction hypothesis on tr ′ we obtain a first-order solution. We finally go back to the original trace tr, using an argument similar to the one in the first direction to handle static equivalence.
⊓ ⊔ Example 17. We illustrate the construction of tr ′ , which is at the core of the above proof. Consider A = ({P 1 , P 2 , P 3 }; Φ) where P i = in(c i , x i ).out(c i , n i ), and Φ 0 = {w 0 ⊲ n 0 }, and n i ∈ N for 0 ≤ i ≤ 3. We assume that c 1 ≺ c 2 ≺ c 3 , and we consider the situation where the nonces n 0 and n 2 (resp. n 1 and n 3 ) are the same.
Let tr = io c3 (X 3 , w 3 ).io c2 (X 2 , w 2 ).io c1 (X 1 , w 1 ) and (Φ; S) the dependency constraint system such that A tr − → d (∅; Φ; S). We consider the substitution θ = {X 3 → start, X 2 → w 3 , X 1 → w 2 }. We note that θ ∈ Sol 2 (Φ; S) but we have that θ ∈ Sol 1 (Φ; S) due to the presence of X 1 ⋉w 2 in S. We could try to fix this problem by building a "better" solution θ ′ that yields the same first-order solution: θ ′ = {X 3 → start, X 2 → w 3 , X 1 → w 0 } is such a candidate. Applying Lemmas 2 and 3, we obtain a smaller symbolic trace:
Let (Φ; S ′ ) be the constraint system obtained from the execution of tr ′ . We have that θ ′ ∈ Sol 2 (Φ; S ′ ) but again θ ′ ∈ Sol 1 (Φ; S ′ ). This is due to the presence of X 2 ⋉w 3 in S ′ -which was initially satisfied by θ in the first-order sense. With one more iteration of this transformation, we obtain a third candidate:
The associated constraint system does not contain any dependency constraint, and thus θ ′′ is trivially a first-order solution.
Applications
We first describe two situations showing that our reduced semantics can yield an exponential benefit. Then, we illustrate the effect of our reduced semantics on our running example, i.e., the private authentication protocol.
Consider first the simple process P = {P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n } where each P i denotes the basic process in(c i , x).if x = ok then out(c i , n i ) with n i ∈ N . There are (2n)!/2 n different traces of size 2n (i.e., containing 2n visible actions) in the concrete semantics. This number is actually the same in the standard symbolic semantics. In the compressed semantics (as well as the symbolic compressed semantics) this number goes down to n!. Finally, in the reduced semantics, there is only one trace such that the resulting constraint system admits a solution. Assuming that c 1 ≺ . . . ≺ c n , that trace is simply:
Next, we consider the simple process P = {P Going back to our running example (see Examples 2 and 7), we represent some symbolic traces obtained using our reduced semantics. We consider:
({P init , Q 0 (skb, pk(ska))}; Φ 0 ; ∅) and we assume that c A ≺ c B . We consider all symbolic traces obtained without considering the Else rule.
Those executions are represented in the diagram on the left, where
The block io 2 a is an improper block since it only contains an input action. First, we may note that many interleavings are not taken into account thanks to compression. Now, consider the symbolic trace io 
Conclusion
We have proposed two refinements of the symbolic semantics for simple processes. The first refinement groups actions in blocks, while the second one uses dependency constraints to restrict to minimal interleavings among a class of permutations. In both cases, the refined semantics has less traces, yet we show that the associated trace equivalence coincides with the standard one. In theory, this yields a potentially exponential algorithmic optimization.
In order to validate our approach, an experimental implementation has been developed 3 . This tool is based on SPEC [20] (which does not support else branches) and implements our modified semantics as well as an adapted constraint resolution procedure that takes (first-order) dependency constraints into account. The latter procedure is quite preliminary and far from optimal. Yet, the modified checker already shows significant improvements over the original version on various benchmarks ( [15] , Figure 9 ).
We are considering several directions for future work. Constraint solving procedures should be studied in depth: we may optimize the one we already developed [15] and we are also interested in studying the problem in other frameworks, e.g., [10] . We also believe that stronger reductions can be achieved: for instance, exploiting symmetries should be very useful for dealing with multiple sessions. 
A Proofs of Section 3
-Assume that we have A out(ci,wi)
= ===== ⇒ A ′ with c i = c j . Because we are considering simple processes, the two actions must be concurrent. More specifically, our process A must be of the form ({P i , P j } ⊎ P r ; Φ) with P i (resp. P j ) being a basic process on channel c i (resp. c j ). We assume that in our sequence of reductions, τ actions pertaining to P i are all executed before reaching A i , and that τ actions pertaining to P r are executed last. This is without loss of generality, because a τ action on a given basic process can easily be permuted with actions taking place on another basic process, since it does not depend on the context and has no effect on the frame. Thus we have that
Since the τ actions taking place on P ′ r rely neither on the frame nor on the first two basic processes, we easily obtain the permuted execution:
-The permutation of two input actions on distinct channels is very similar. In this case, the frame does not change at all, and the order in which messages are derived from the frame does not matter. Moreover, the instantiation of the input variable on one basic process has no impact on the other ones.
= ==== ⇒ A ′ with c i = c j and w i ∈ fv (R). Again, the two actions are concurrent, and we can assume that τ actions are organized conveniently so that A is of the form ({P i , P j } ⊎ P r ; Φ) with P i (resp. P j ) a basic process on c i (resp. c j ); A i is of the form ({P
As before, the τ actions from P r to P ′ r are easily moved around. Additionnally, w i ∈ fv (R) implies fv (R) ⊆ dom(Φ) and thus we have:
The next step is trivial:
-We also have to perform the reverse permutation, but we shall not detail it; this time we are delaying the derivation of R from the frame, and it only gets easier. Proof. We first observe that
′ is initial and tr is a (possibly empty) sequence of output actions on the same channel. We prove this by induction on the sequence of actions. If it is empty, we can conclude using one of the Proper rules because A = A ′ is initial. Otherwise, we have:
We obtain A ′′ tr − → → o * A ′ by induction hypothesis, and conclude using rules Tau and Out.
The next step is to show that A
′ is initial and tr is the concatenation of a (possibly empty) sequence of inputs and a nonempty sequence of outputs, all on the same channel. This is easily shown by induction on the number of input actions. If there is none we use the previous result, otherwise we conclude by induction hypothesis and using rules Tau and In. Otherwise, the first output action allows us to conclude from the previous result and rules Tau and Out.
We can now show that A
′ is initial and tr is a proper block. Indeed, we must have
which allows us to conclude using the previous result and rules Tau and In.
We finally obtain that A tr = ⇒ A ′ implies A tr − → c A ′ when A and A ′ are initial simple processes and tr is a sequence of proper blocks. This is done by induction on the number of blocks. The base case is trivial. Because A is initial, the execution of its basic processes can only start with visible actions, thus only one basic process is involved in the execution of the first block. Moreover, we can assume without loss of generality that the execution of this first block results in another initial process: indeed the basic process resulting from that execution is either in the final process A ′ , which is initial, or it will perform another block, i.e., it can perform τ actions followed by an input, in which case we can force those τ actions to take place as early as possible. Thus we have
where b is a proper block, and we conclude using the previous result and the induction hypothesis.
⊓ ⊔ Proof. We proceed by induction on the length of tr, and distinguish two cases:
-If tr has no output action then, by swapping input actions on distinct channels, we reorder tr so as to obtain tr i = tr c1 · . . . · tr cn = Ia tr where the c i 's are pairwise distinct and tr ci is an improper block on channel c i . -Otherwise, there must be a decomposition tr = tr 1 ·out(c, w)·tr 2 such that tr 1 does not contain any output. We can perform swaps involving input actions of tr 1 on all channel c ′ = c, so that they are delayed after the first output on c. We obtain tr = Ia in(c,
such that either tr ′ 2 does not contain any action on channel c or the first one is an input action. We have thus isolated a first proper block, and we can conclude by induction hypothesis on tr
⊓ ⊔ Note that the above result does not exploit all the richness of I a . In particular, it never relies on the possibility to swap an input action before an output when the input message does not use the output handled. Indeed, the idea behind compression does not rely on messages. This will change in Section 5 where we will use I a more fully.
We finally prove the main result about the compressed semantics. Given two simple process A = (P; Φ) and
Theorem 1. Let A and B be two initial simple processes. We have that:
Proof. We prove the two directions separately.
(⇒) Let A be an initial simple process such that A ≈ B and A tr − → c A ′ . One can easily see that our trace tr must be of the form tr io · tr i where tr io is made of proper blocks and tr i is a (possibly empty) sequence of inputs on the same channel c j . We have:
Using Proposition 1, we obtain that A trio = = ⇒ A ′′ . We also claim that A ′′ tri = ⇒ A + for some A + having the same frame as A ′ . This is obvious when tr i is emptyin that case we can simply choose A + = A ′ = A ′′ . Otherwise, the execution of the improper block tr i results from the application of rule Improper. Except for the fact that this rule "kills" the resulting process, its subderivation simply packages a sequence of inputs, and so we have a suitable A + . We thus have: 
We can assume that B ′′ does not have any basic process starting with a test, without loss of generality since forcing τ actions cannot break static equivalence. Further, we observe that B ′′ is initial. Otherwise, it would mean that a basic process of B is not initial (absurd) or that one of the blocks of tr io , which are maximal for A, is not maximal for B (absurd again, because it contradicts A ≈ B). This allows us to apply Proposition 2 to obtain
This concludes when tr i is empty, because
Otherwise, we note that A + cannot perform any action on channel c j , because the execution of tr i in the compressed semantics must be maximal. Since A ≈ B, it must be that B + cannot perform any visible action on the channel c j either. Thus B
′′
can complete an improper step:
We can finally conclude that
(⇐) Let A be an initial simple process such that A ≈ c B and A tr = ⇒ A ′ . We "complete" this execution as follows:
-We force τ actions whenever possible.
-If the last action on c in tr is an input, we trigger available inputs on c using an arbitrary public constant as a recipe. -We trigger all the outputs that are available.
We obtain a trace of the form tr · tr + . Let A + be the process obtained from this trace:
We observe that A + is initial: indeed, for each basic process that performs actions in tr · tr + , either the last action on its channel is an output and the basic process is of the form in(c, ).P , or the last action is an input and the basic process is reduced to 0 and disappears.
Next, we apply Proposition 3 to obtain traces tr io (resp. tr i ) made of proper (resp. improper) blocks, such that tr · tr + = I a tr io · tr i . By Lemma 1 we know that this permuted trace can also lead to A + :
As before, we can assume that A io cannot perform any τ action. Under this condition, since A + is initial, A io must also be initial.
By Proposition 2 we have that A trio − − → c A io , and A ≈ c B implies that:
A simple inspection of the Proper rules shows that a basic process resulting from the execution of a proper block must be initial. Thus, since the whole simple process B is initial, B io is initial too. We can now execute all these inputs to obtain an execution of tr io · tr i towards some process B + :
Permuting those actions, we obtain thanks to Lemma 1: Focused symbolic semantics. The main idea of the compressed symbolic semantics is to ensure that when a process starts executing some actions, it executes a maximal block of actions.
In (P ; Φ; S)
in(c,X)
in(c,X).tr
out(c,w).tr
Compressed symbolic semantics. We define the compressed symbolic reduction − → c between symbolic processes as the least reflexive transitive relation satisfying the following rules:
B.2 Soundness and completeness
Proposition 4. Let (P; Φ) be a simple process such that (P; Φ; ∅)
and θ ∈ Sol(Φ ′ ; S ′ ). We have that (P; Φ)
where λ is the firstorder solution of (P ′ ; Φ ′ ; S ′ ) associated to θ.
Proof. This proof can be done by induction on the length of the derivation (P; Φ; ∅) tr − → c (P ′ ; Φ ′ ; S ′ ) considering two different cases when dealing with the last block of actions: the case of an application of the rule Block and the case of Failure.
To establish the soundness of the derivation made of one block of actions, we do an induction on the proof tree witnessing this derivation. At each step, we make use of the soundness of the standard symbolic semantics (as it has been shown, e.g., in [12] ).
⊓ ⊔ Proposition 5. Let (P; Φ) be a simple process such that (P; Φ)
There exists a symbolic process (P s ; Φ s ; S), a solution θ ∈ Sol(Φ s ; S), and a sequence tr s such that:
where λ is the first-order solution of (P s ; Φ s ; S) associated to θ.
Proof. The proof of this proposition is similar to the previous one. We rely on the completeness of the standard symbolic semantics as shown in [12] .
⊓ ⊔ Theorem 2. For any extended simple processes A and B, we have that:
Proof. We prove the two implications separately relying on Proposition 4 and Proposition 5 to go from the symbolic compressed semantics to its concrete counterpart and vice-versa. ⊓ ⊔ Corollary 1. For any extended simple processes A and B, we have that:
C Proofs of Section 5 By definition of I a and I b , for all blocks
, we have that b 1 I b b 2 if, and only if, a 1 I a a 2 for any action a 1 in b 1 and a 2 in b 2 . Thus we have that for all concrete traces tr 1 , and tr 2 made of proper blocks, tr 1 = I a tr 2 ⇐⇒ tr 1 = I b tr 2 . In particular, we have that tr c = I a trθ.
By applying Proposition 1, we have that (P 0 ; Φ 0 ) trθ = ⇒ (Pλ θ ; Φλ θ ). Using Lemma 1, we deduce that (P 0 ; Φ 0 ) trc = ⇒ (Pλ θ ; Φλ θ ), and then relying on Proposition 2 we obtain that (P 0 ; Φ 0 ) trc −→ c (Pλ θ ; Φλ θ ).
Proposition 5 gives us a symbolic execution (P 0 ; Φ 0 ; ∅) tr ′ − → c (P s ; Φ s ; S s ) and a substitution θ ′ ∈ Sol(Φ s ; S s ) such that Pλ θ = P s λ ′ θ and tr ′ θ ′ = tr c . Further, it can be seen from the proof of Proposition 5 that the execution of tr ′ actually has the same structure as the one for tr c . In particular, they make the same choices between Then and Else rules. Additionally, we can assume without loss of generality that fresh variables associated to an action in tr ′ are the same as those associated with the corresponding action in tr. This means that tr ′ is actually a permutation of tr, and we have P s = P and Φ s = Φ. Finally, since we have tr Proof. In order to prove the above result, which relies on our specific definitions of I b and ≺, we are going to exploit a more general result by Anisimov and Knuth [3] , that holds in any partially commutative monoid: − → X , − → ∅ ) where tr io is made of proper blocks, and the last block of tr is improper. We have the following execution (note that we necessarily have that P A = ∅):
Let tr Example 18. We illustrate how the second-order semantics is weaker than the first-order one, unless restrictions can be placed on recipes. We start by observing that "non-normal" recipes create spurious dependencies. For instance, π 1 ( u, w ) has a second-order dependency on w, but it is hardly relevant since the recipe is equal to u modulo E. This kind of problem can easily be avoided by showing that it is enough to consider one representative modulo E. But more complex cases arise quickly: assuming that two handles w 1 and w 2 refer to the same message, the (normal-form) recipe adec(aenc(u, pk( w, w 1 )), pk( w, w 2 )) seems to depend on w while it is just a convoluted way of deriving u. Again, this problem can be avoided by integrating more complex observations: it has been shown that for standard cryptographic primitives, it is not needed to consider recipes that apply a destructor on top of a constructor (e.g., [11] ). It is possible that, under such assumptions, the simpler second-order semantic becomes interesting enough in itself.
By inductive hypothesis, we have that B We also have that Φ 
